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BANNING SHARIA IS A “RED HERRING”: THE WAY FORWARD 
FOR ALL AMERICANS 
ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA’IM* 
PLENARY ADDRESS 
I am delighted to be here this morning. As you heard, I am a Muslim from 
Sudan and have been a Muslim activist for human rights for at least forty 
years. As an activist, I have worked to promote human rights from an Islamic 
perspective since I was a law student in the 1960s. Furthermore, I see no 
contradiction whatsoever between being a Muslim and being a human rights 
advocate. It is from that perspective, when I read the bill1 on its own terms, in 
terms of fundamentally protecting people against violations of their rights, that 
I do not think any Muslim would have a problem with the bill. But, the 
problem might come from the fact that we feel that we need such a bill. The 
bill is redundant, and that is why the “anti-Sharia” or “banning Sharia” tags 
seem to hold, though it is no longer in this draft bill. If the bill is not trying to 
ban Sharia then there is no reason to present this bill. 
American judges already have a fundamental constitutional obligation.2 
Their oath of office, their training, and the entire tradition of the American 
judiciary require judges to protect the rights of individuals.3 It is remarkable 
that we would feel in any of the states of the union of the United States that we 
would need to remind our judges of their fundamental obligations as American 
judges under the American Constitution. Since this notion is so redundant and 
so odd, people will start looking for some other reason for presentation of this 
bill. Simply, it does not seem to be addressing any problem, especially as far as 
this state is concerned.4 For those who followed what happened in Oklahoma 
and what the Tenth Circuit said about a similar bill, which mentioned the term 
“Sharia.” In that case, the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, said 
 
* Charles Howard Candler Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. This Plenary 
Address consists of an edited transcript of remarks given by Professor An-Na’im at the Invisible 
Constitutions symposium held at Saint Louis University School of Law. 
 1. H.R. 1512, 96th Gen. Assemb. (Mo. 2012). 
 2. MO. CONST. art. VI, § 11. 
 3. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964). 
 4. Unlike other states, where “Sharia” was applied to settle disputes, Missouri has had no 
similar occurrences. See generally CTR. FOR SEC. POLICY, SHARIA LAW AND AMERICAN 
COURTS: AN ASSESSMENT OF STATE APPELLATE COURT CASES (2011). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
288 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:287 
that the main problem with the bill was it was not addressing a problem.5 There 
was no problem that the bill was supposed to fix. 
But, in any case, I am not attempting to debate or contest the basis of 
[what] the bill is and its language as much as I am trying to link what we seem 
to be talking about here in relation to the theme of this conference and the 
implications of what Representative Curtman said about the American 
Declaration of Independence, the American Constitution, and the process of 
promoting, building, and sustaining a culture of constitutionalism.6 We cannot 
just simply assume that because previous generations of Americans have 
upheld these values that our generation or subsequent generations will do so.7 I 
would therefore urge that the value of republican government and 
constitutionalism must be reaffirmed by every generation. So, the challenge as 
I see it is how our current American generations are reaffirming these values in 
light of today’s realities of the United States. The demographics of the United 
States today are not the same as 1779. What do we have here and now? Who 
are the Americans who are entitled to these protections? Are our protections of 
these rights inclusive of all Americans today as we speak? I think that is where 
we need to apply our effort. 
Trying to link the topic to the conference theme, I would suggest that 
“invisible constitutions” are actually the real constitutions, not the written text. 
The written text can only be a reflection of the underlying values of culture and 
religion that people live by. And if constitutionalism is not in the hearts and 
minds of American men and women, having them in a written document is not 
going to make any difference. What we have seen as the history of American 
constitutionalism is the history of the development of the values of 
constitutionalism through the last two centuries and not our clever or our 
technical construction of the document that was written some 200 years ago. 
Consider what Professor Walker said about the history of this state (Missouri) 
and the history of the United States at large in terms of persecution of religious 
groups and communities.8 You will find that, for instance, Catholics were 
persecuted horrendously for many decades during the nineteenth-century, and 
 
 5. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1130 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 6. Rep. Paul Curtman, Remarks at Saint Louis University School of Law Symposium: 
Invisible Constitutions (Mar. 2, 2012), http://slu.edu/school-of-law-home/faculty-and-administra 
tion/news-and-events/events/culture-religion-and-memory/videos. 
 7. As Thomas Jefferson said: “We may consider each generation as a distinct nation, with a 
right, by the will of its majority, to bind themselves, but none to bind the succeeding generation, 
more than the inhabitants of another country.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Wayles 
Eppes (Jun. 1813), in THE JEFFERSON CYCLOPEDIA: A COMPREHENSIVE COLLECTION OF THE 
VIEWS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 228 (John Foley ed., 1900). 
 8. Anders Walker, Remarks at Saint Louis University School of Law Symposium: Invisible 
Constitutions (Mar. 2, 2012), http://slu.edu/school-of-law-home/faculty-and-administration/news-
and-events/events/culture-religion-and-memory/videos. 
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hostility or suspicion of Catholics may still persist among some American 
Christian denominations. 
I happen to be writing a book about American Muslims, and I’ll talk about 
it later on, but in the course of doing that I have come to study the degree of 
persecution of other religious communities—Catholics, Jews, and Mormons— 
that really belies our claim that we have affirmed from the start all these values 
and never strayed away from them. It is not true that the American Declaration 
of Independence was being upheld when the Catholics were being persecuted, 
and they were persecuted for decades. And it is not true that the American 
Declaration of Independence was being upheld when Jews were persecuted or 
when the Mormons were being expelled from this state.9 
In fact, it is not true that American history was true to the phrase that 
Representative Curtman quoted from the Declaration of Independence, that 
“all men [were] created equal.”10 For one thing, of course, not all men and 
women were equal. American women did not have equality under the 
American Constitution for another century. The right to vote took a 
constitutional amendment to become a fundamental right for women.11 Slavery 
was practiced by the same so-called founders who proclaimed these values. So, 
how can all men be equal when some men were slaves? And how can all men 
be equal when women were denied the right to vote? It took a civil war and 
another constitutional amendment to abolish slavery.12 The point is not to 
belittle the achievements of American constitutionalism, but simply to 
acknowledge the fact that it is a long, protracted, contingent, contested process. 
The process is constantly vulnerable to regression. It’s constantly vulnerable to 
hijacking and misappropriation. Our claim that we have achieved something is 
most at risk when we feel that we are secure in that claim. The true spirit of the 
American Constitution, or any constitution for that matter, is never to be 
confident that you have made it, that your constitution is beyond reproach and 
that your practice is beyond regression. 
So, that is how I see the connection. Sometimes, I also make the point 
about national sentiments. The constitution is not the written document, 
although ritualistically we have a document; we put it in various places and 
display it every now and then. All these sort of ritualistic practices are trying to 
create the mythology of constitutionalism, but the reality of constitutionalism 
is in the blood and struggle, in the hearts and minds of the people of this 
country: men and women, African-American and Caucasian, Latinos, new 
immigrants. What is the current population of the United States? What is the 
current demographic of the United States and how representative are the values 
 
 9. Id. 
 10. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
 12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
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of constitutionalism for the totality of the population of the United States? You 
can never escape that issue. 
I want to make one point, and I definitely do not want to be disrespectful, 
but one of the insights about being a believer is that you know that human 
existence is transient. Nothing human is permanent. Nothing human is perfect, 
never ever. It is constantly imperfect at any point in time. The only question is 
can you see the imperfection of it or not. 
There was a time when there was no United States, and there will be a time 
when there will be no United States. I’m not sure if any of us have the illusion 
that the United States is a permanent institution in history. There is no 
exception. No human institution, no human civilization, no human political 
structure has ever been permanent. All high civilizations have come to pass, 
and this high civilization will come to pass. And the question is what values 
did we contribute to the history of humanity? Were our contributions positive 
or negative on the balance of history over time? 
So, the point that I was coming to earlier regarding reading the text of the 
bill is that banning Sharia is a red herring. Banning Sharia is not only, simply, 
a futile legislative waste of time, but a dangerous claim, because it promotes 
bigoted ignorance and interreligious hostility. These types of legislation will be 
extremely harmful to the interests of the United States at home and abroad. On 
its text and probably by the intention of its promoters,13 this bill is not intended 
to be an anti-Sharia bill, but the fact that it is cited as such and debated as such 
shows that that is how it registers in the consciousness of the communities.14 
And the way it registers in the consciousness of communities is what is 
worrying. By affecting communities this way, the bill is undermining 
fundamental values of American constitutionalism. 
Therefore, I will suggest that the bill’s promoters must make it very clear 
that the bill is not intended to ban Sharia. It is not enough to try to correct or 
adjust the language in a way that makes it technically constitutional. The only 
way the promoters of the bill can succeed in making their text constitutional is 
to avoid making it applicable to Sharia. Since that outcome is mandated by the 
Constitution of the United States, as most immediately determined by the 
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit,15 the promoters of the bill must 
explain that to their constituencies that the bill does not ban Sharia. 
There is a paradox in trying to ban Sharia in the United States. If the bill 
appears to be targeting Sharia, it will be found unconstitutional.16 If a bill does 
not target Sharia by name, then Sharia, to the extent that you think it is a threat 
or a danger, will not be affected. If you try to explain all the types of scenarios 
 
 13. See Curtman, supra note 6. 
 14. Andrea Elliot, Behind an Anti-Shariah Push, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2011, at A1. 
 15. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1128–29 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 16. Id. 
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or situations which you think Sharia permits so that you can ban them by 
statute in the United States, the task will be too complex and controversial. 
There is no single code or authoritative source of Sharia as a legal text. All you 
can do is to cite all the statutes and judicial opinions from about forty Muslim-
majority countries around the world which you think are Sharia-based.17 Then 
you will need to support your claim that the statute or judicial decision in 
question is in fact truly based on Sharia principles. Assuming for the sake of 
argument that you are able to do all this, the question becomes how to include 
all that information in the draft bill being presented for the State of Missouri or 
any other state of the United States. 
I think one of the main problems with this issue is a lack of understanding 
of what Sharia means. This lack of understanding is what I mean by bigoted 
ignorance. 
Sharia is the totality of the religious obligation of Muslims. Everything to 
do with being a Muslim falls under the heading of Sharia. As explained by 
Professor Gordon Newby, 
[t]he term [Sharia] refers to God’s law in its divine and revealed sense. This is 
related to FIQH, which is the human process of understanding and 
implementing the law. Commentators have argued that the aggregate of all 
sources by which we know God’s law is but a small part of sharicah, which, 
like God, is unknowable and must be accepted. When the word is used as 
synonymous with fiqh, it refers to the entirety of Islamic law, often in its 
actual, historical, and potential senses. Following the original meaning of the 
Arabic word, it is said to be the source from which all properly Islamic 
behaviors derive.18 
The term Sharia does not occur in the Qur’an at all in the meaning that we 
use it today.19 In fact, the term Sharia does not exist in Muslim sources for the 
first 300 years of Islam.20 In other words, Sharia is not a term or concept that is 
 
 17. For a comprehensive listing of all countries of the world and the percentage of adherents 
of various religions, including Islam, see Religions, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia. 
gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2122.html (last visited Sep. 2, 2012). 
 18. GORDON D. NEWBY, A CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM 193–94 (2002). 
 19. The term “Sharia” appears once in the Quran (quoted as chapter followed by verse 
numbers) 45:18. The meaning of this verse can be translated as follows: “We (God) have decreed 
for you a clear path, so follow it and do not follow the whims of those who do not know.” In the 
context of that chapter, the point is clearly about religious guidance, not legal regulation. The 
other four mention of derivations of the term as a verb and pronoun (42:13 and 21; 5:48), all 
speak of religious guidance, not legal norms. In fact, only about eighty verses out of a total of 
6219 verses of the Quran have legal subject matter in the modern sense of the term. ABDULLAHI 
AHMED AN-NA’IM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION: CIVIL LIBERTIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (1990). 
 20. Wilfred Candwell Smith, The Concept of Sharia Among Some Mutakallimun 
[Theologians], in ARAB AND ISLAMIC STUDIES IN HONOR OF HALLILTON A. R. GIBB 581, 581–
602 (George Makdisi ed., 1965). 
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interchangeable with Islam that you find from the beginning. In fact, if you 
said the term Sharia to any of the Muslims of the first several generations of 
Muslims, they wouldn’t know what you were talking about. 
So, the term was coined three centuries after the beginning of Islam. 
Moreover, when it was first coined, it was used by theologians to mean 
something quite different from what it came to mean in the post-colonial 
context of today.21 Part of my work is to show that this whole discourse 
regarding Islamic states that can enforce Sharia is a post-colonial discourse.22 
My claim here can easily be verified by using some of the CD-ROMs which 
contain hundreds of volumes of original manuscripts of Islamic sources. You 
can use this resource in Arabic, Farsi, or Urdu to perform a search for “Islamic 
state.” My claim is that you will not be able to find the term “Islamic state” in 
any scholarship or sources of Muslim history until the mid-twentieth century.23 
One of the obvious reasons for this is that this term assumes a European model 
of the nation state and its positive law legal systems which were introduced 
into Muslim-majority countries for the first time in their history by European 
colonialism. The first codification of Sharia ever attempted was the Ottoman 
Majella in the mid-nineteenth century.24 However, that was a codification of a 
single school regarding a single subject which was the Hanafai School of 
Islamic jurisprudence on the law of obligations and contracts, not the totality of 
Sharia even according to this particular school. So, the idea that Sharia is ready 
to be enacted into statutory law for the state to enforce is an extremely recent 
post-colonial idea. It is post-colonial for the simple reason that it uses the 
colonial idea of the state and the colonial idea of law, because it’s talking about 
positive state law of a territorial state, a so-called nation state. Muslims did not 
live in territorial states and did not have state enforcement of Sharia before 
colonialism. 
I would add that even the idea of enacting a principle of Sharia into a state 
negates the quality of its being Sharia. By that I mean, if you take a principle, 
say for example prohibition of drinking alcohol, and enact that into a statute, 
the language of the statute becomes the law, not the principle, and the authority 
of the law is the political will of the state, not the religious law of Islam. This 
change in authority is why Sharia cannot be enacted as a state law. The 
principle ceases to be Sharia by its enactment into statutory law. It becomes 
something else. 
 
 21. On pre-colonial application of Sharia see, e.g., KNUT VIKOR, BETWEEN GOD AND 
SULTAN: A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 174–80 (2005). 
 22. ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA’IM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE (2010). 
 23. For example, RUHOLLAH KHOMEINI, ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT (1979), the basic text for 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, represents a clear departure from the orthodox historical position of 
Shia Islam. 
 24. AN-NA’IM, supra note 22, at 17, 194, 287. 
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Additionally, there are also other reasons why Sharia cannot be enacted by 
the state. Simply, there are too many conflicting and divergent views on every 
single imaginable subject. Sharia is comprehensive; it covers everything from 
articles of faith to ritual practices to etiquette, even social ethics.25 The Ten 
Commandments are Sharia.26 The question the representative specifically 
mentioned about contracts and charging interest on loans, and so on, are all 
subjects of Sharia norms.27 The point to emphasize, however, is that Sharia 
must be accepted and practiced by believers voluntarily if it is to have any 
religious value. As soon as a state statute coerces believers into doing so, then 
the act is no longer a religious act. So, you may have conformity with the norm 
but it does not have any religious significance if it is coercively enforced. You 
cannot discharge a religious obligation by obeying a state law. 
Whatever the state law is, it will have to exclude some view on the issue 
and prefer other views. State law cannot say that a contract can be this or the 
other depending on the school of Islamic jurisprudence you wish to subscribe 
to or accept. The law must adopt a specific definition and requirements of a 
valid contract and enforce that view by coercive power, if necessary. For 
example, if you take the subject of contract law, the scholars disagree as to 
what is the lawful subject of a contract. There is some overlap but there are 
also significant differences. Therefore, when you come to enact a statute to 
define what constitutes a valid contract and what could be a lawful subject of a 
contract, a legislature must choose one view among the competing views of the 
scholars. By choosing one view, the state is denying believers their freedom to 
choose other views, as has always been the way Sharia was practiced by 
Muslims through community-based practice, not through state enforcement.28 
There was no centralized administration of justice, and no state function of 
public prosecution. The state does not have the power to make law or the 
power to enforce law. Litigants choose judges they prefer to go to by their 
choice. This is why the state may enforce particular subjects which are of 
political significance for the state, but not the majority of Sharia principles that 
Muslims live by every day. 
 
 25. AN-NA’IM, supra note 19, at 11, 31–33. 
 26. Here are some particularly normative examples of the Ten Commandments, as listed in 
Exodus, Chapter 20 of the Bible, with the corresponding Chapter and verse of the Quran laying 
down the same normative command: 5. Honour thy father and thy mother—The Quran, 2:83, 
4:36, 6:151; 6. Thou shalt not kill—The Quran, 5:32; 6:151; 17:33; 7. Thou shalt not commit 
adultery—The Quran, 17:32; 60:12; 8. Thou shalt not steal—The Quran, 60:12; 5:38; 9. Thou 
shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor—The Quran, 25:72; 65:2; 10. Thou shalt not 
covet thy neighbour’s house, thou shalt not covet thy neighbour’s wife—The Quran, 4:54. 
 27. See Curtman, supra note 6. 
 28. NOEL J. COULSON, CONFLICTS AND TENSIONS IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 34 (1969). 
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So, I think there is a lot of misunderstanding about what Sharia has been 
and what it currently is by its own terms. Therefore, we cannot really talk 
about it in terms of something that the state can enforce, prohibit, or ban. 
The Pew Research Center estimates in 2011 that there are 2.75 million 
Muslims residing in the United States, which represents an increase from the 
2.35 [million] estimate revealed by the 2007 Pew Poll. To put this range in 
global perspective, the world’s Muslim population is expected to rise from 1.6 
billion in 2010 to 2.2 billion by 2030.29 
The 2011 Pew Research Center study reports that about two-thirds of the 
Muslims in the U.S. today (63%) are first-generation immigrants (foreign-
born), while slightly more than a third (37%) were born in the U.S. By 2030, 
however, more than four-in-ten of the Muslims in the U.S. (44.9%) are 
expected to be native-born.30 
According to a 2004 Zogby International Survey, about one-third of 
Muslim-Americans are of South Asian descent; 26% are Arabs and another 
20% are African-Americans. However, the 2011 Pew Poll found that 30% of 
American Muslims describe themselves as white (including most Arabs who 
classify themselves as white Caucasian), 23% as black, and 21% as Asian. 
So, American Muslims are a very mixed population and community, and 
therefore it is very difficult to talk about American Muslims in the singular. It 
is not a single community but multiple, very different communities. In fact, 
some of these communities would not accept other communities as Muslim. 
The Ahmadis (Ahmadya), for example, are considered by both Sunni and Shia 
Muslims to be non-Muslims.31 
 
 29. Muslim Americans: No Signs of Growth in Alienation or Support for Extremism, PEW 
RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS (Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.people-
press.org/2011/08/30/muslim-americans-no-signs-of-growth-in-alienation-or-support-for-extrem 
ism/ [hereinafter Muslim Americans]; The Future of the Global Muslim Population: Projections 
from 2010 to 2030, PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS (Jan. 27, 2011), 
http://www.pewforum.org/Global-Muslim-Population.aspx. 
 30. Muslim Americans, supra note 29, 7–8. 
 31. The persecution of Ahmadya as apostates (heretics) started in the Indian sub-continent, 
on the charge that they believe the founder of their group, Ahmad Quadiani, to be a prophet after 
the Prophet Muhammad, while all Sunni and Shia Muslims believe the Prophet Muhammad to be 
the final and conclusive prophet. In Pakistan, for instance, Article 260(3) was added in 1974 to 
the Constitution of 1973 to provide: 
In the Constitution and all enactments and other legal instruments, unless there is anything 
repugnant in the subject or context, 
(a) “Muslim” means a person who believes in the unity and oneness of Almighty Allah, in 
the absolute and unqualified finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad (peace be upon 
him), the last of the prophets, and does not believe in, or recognize as a prophet or 
religious reformer, any person who claimed or claims to be a prophet, in any sense of the 
word or of any description whatsoever, after Muhammad (peace be upon him); and 
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It is therefore problematic to speak of all American Muslims as a single 
unified group, but they would all self-identify as Muslims, and they are all 
equal citizens of the United States. Therefore, they are entitled to being able to 
participate in what I call religious self-determination. They have the right to be 
Muslim by their choice under the law in the same equal way as any other 
American citizen may freely adopt any religious or other belief. 
In an attempt to present and promote that idea, I’m trying to work on the 
book that I mentioned earlier. The working title is “Beyond Minority Politics: 
American Muslims and Citizenship.” The central point of the book is that 
American Muslims should not be identified as a religious minority, because 
they are not only defined as Muslim. They are Americans who happen to be 
Muslim, but they are also many other things, too. In fact, the very idea of 
majority and minority is misleading. Everybody is a member of a minority in 
some respect, and everybody is a member of a majority in some respect also. 
Every single person in this room who may feel like being part of a majority, 
for example, Christian and/or Caucasian, is in fact, in some respect, part of a 
minority. Similarly, this is true about Muslims, because we are not exclusively 
defined by being Muslims. I, for example, am an American Muslim. I came to 
this country seventeen years ago, but I’ve been an American citizen for the last 
twelve years. I’m an African-American, yes. I’m a Muslim, yes. But, I’m also 
a professional, a law teacher. I’m this. I’m that. Politically, I’m in a majority in 
fact, because I vote for a party that is a majority party. My political identity is 
probably more significant in terms of my citizenship than my Islamic identity. 
Yet, I know that this claim would be very difficult for other people to accept—
even other Muslims may not think about identity in this way. 
My point is that we must go beyond this notion that Muslims are defined 
by being Muslims and nothing else but Muslims, or for that matter that 
Mormons are just Mormons and nothing but Mormons, or that Catholics are 
Catholics and nothing but. These types of definitions were exactly the reason 
why Catholics were persecuted and Mormons were persecuted. Because in the 
1830s, ‘40s, and ‘50s, Catholics were not seen as Americans who happen to be 
Catholics. They were seen as Catholics, who can’t really be true Americans, 
and that has come to pass, I hope. Still, I’m sure that some of it is lingering 
with the Mormons and with everybody else. So, the idea of the book I am 
writing about American Muslims is to say that we should be serious about how 
our citizenship enables our choice of identity and that we should respect that 
 
(b) “non-Muslim” means a person who is not a Muslim and includes a person belonging 
to the Christian, Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist or Parsi community, a person of the Quadiani 
Group or the Lahori Group (who call themselves ‘Ahmadis’ or by any name), or a Bahai, 
and a person belonging to any of the Scheduled Castes. 
Jeffrey Redding, Constitutionalizing Islam: Theory and Pakistan, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 759, 769–70 
(2004). 
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we all have multiple identities. Every single one of us in this room again—
none of us is a mono-identity person. We have multiple identities, and we have 
overlapping identities. 
Furthermore, we are very tactical about the identities we choose to assert 
or not to assert. It is something that we do almost subconsciously. Every time 
any of us walks into a room, she or he would need to make some type of 
calculation as to what one is supposed to be in that context. Am I a lawyer or 
law professor? Am I to identify in terms of my political affiliations or some 
social identity? If the latter, which one? Should one identify by race or 
ethnicity or avoid that? So the choices that we make tactically in order to 
decide what to assert, do, or say or not, are driven by very human impulses of 
self-interest in relation to our social identity, political affiliation, and so forth. 
So, I think we really must try to take ourselves beyond this notion of 
religious minorities who are permanent minorities. If Muslims are only 
Muslims and nothing else, then they cannot fully realize their citizenship and 
social or professional affiliations. It is also important to note that whatever 
denomination of Christianity one belongs to, one is a member of a religious 
minority compared to all other Christian Americans. Even within the same 
denomination, there are all sorts of social, economic, and political differences 
that make them members of a minority in some way or another. 
In conclusion, therefore, I don’t think that we are served well by boxing 
people and being boxed into exclusive categories of identity. We must 
emphasize our shared citizenship and challenge ourselves to uphold the value 
of that citizenship. We must also do so by today’s values and standards, and 
not those of two-hundred years ago. We like to talk about Jefferson and 
Madison and other founders of American constitutionalism as profound and 
insightful leaders, and they are indeed that for humanity at large. Yet none of 
us would want to live in the world those founders constructed and lived in. All 
of us would want to benefit from the historical achievements of great human 
beings, but take those benefits as we understand them in our lives here and 
now, in the twenty-first century. This is, I submit, the way forward for all 
Americans. 
Thank you very much. 
 
